If, as the new B-theory of time maintains, tensed sentences have tenseless truth conditions, it follows that it is possible for two sentence-tokens to have the same truth conditions, but different meanings. This conclusion forces a rethink of the traditional identification of truth conditions with meaning. There is an aspect of the meanings of tensed sentences which is not captured by their truth conditions, and which has so far eluded explanation. In this paper I intend to locate, examine and explain this feature of tensed meaning.
3 this difference? What accounts for it? I take David Kaplan's (1989) distinction between character and content as the model for my account of the notion of tensed meaning. My proposal is to adapt Kaplan's distinction to render it consistent with the token-reflexive version of the new B-theory of time. Ultimately I will strengthen the doctrine of the new B-theory of time that tense is an irreducible feature of language and thought, but not a feature of time at all. Furthermore, my account will supplement this theory of time by providing an account of tensed meaning, a notion that has hitherto remained unexplained.
Smith's argument against Mellor's B-theory of time

!
Quentin Smith (1987 Smith ( , 1993 argues that D. H. Mellor's (1981) version of the new B-theory of time fails. 1 According to Smith, Mellor's theory is self-contradictory.
The contradiction is this: since Mellor's theory is a version of the new B-theory, he holds that tensed sentences cannot be translated by tenseless sentences (he subscribes to the untranslatability thesis). The reason that Mellor advances in support of the untranslatability thesis is that no tenseless sentence can translate a tensed sentence because they have different truth conditions. However, he also holds that a tensed and a tenseless sentence-token can state the same fact, and this is equivalent to the claim that they have the same truth conditions. So, Mellor holds both that tensed and tenseless sentences have different truth conditions, which is the reason why they cannot translate one another, and that tensed and tenseless sentence-tokens can state the same fact, and thus, must have the same truth conditions. 1 In Real Time II (1998) Mellor relinquishes the token-reflexive version of the new B-theory of time that he defended in Real Time (1981) . He adopts instead a date version of the new B-theory of time. His reason for doing so is that he thinks the token-reflexive version "cannot cope with propositions like 'there are no tokens now', which can be true even though they can have no true tokens." (Mellor (1998) pp. xi-xii) I argue elsewhere (Dyke, forthcoming) that, properly understood, the token-reflexive version of the new B-theory can cope very well with sentences, tokens of which would all be false. 4 ! L. A. Paul (1997) defends Mellor against this argument of Smith's. She argues that Mellor is not committed to the second of these inconsistent claims. That is, a tensed sentence and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions do not state all and only the same facts, so they don't have the same truth conditions as each other. Using Mellor's examples, the tensed sentence S, "It is now 1980", and the tenseless sentence U, "S occurs in 1980", both state the fact that S occurs in 1980.
However, U states an additional fact, according to Paul. It states that its tokens, if true, are true regardless of when they are tokened. (Paul, (1997) 58) But this is simply false. It is not the case that tenseless sentences state the fact that their tokens, if true, are true regardless of when they are tokened. This is true of tenseless sentences, but it is not something that tenseless sentences themselves express. Consequently, unless there is some other fact that S states, but U doesn't (or vice versa), Mellor must still address Smith's argument.
What are Mellor's options here? On the face of it, he must choose whether or not it is possible for tensed and tenseless sentences to have the same truth conditions. If Smith is right, then making this choice will force him to give up either the untranslatability thesis or the thesis that tensed and tenseless sentence-tokens can state the same fact. If he gives up the untranslatability thesis, then his theory collapses into the old B-theory of time, and it has been conceded that this fails. But if he gives up the thesis that tensed and tenseless sentence-tokens can state the same fact, then he jeopardises his conclusion that time consists just of a B-series. This is because it leaves room for the A-theorist to argue that there are facts which can be stated only by tensed sentence tokens, namely, tensed facts: facts about the pastness, presentness or futurity of events. But Mellor wants to deny that reality contains any tensed facts. truth-values, because one is produced before the end of the ceremony, and the other just after. It is also true that the truth-values of tokens of tenseless types do not vary according to when they are produced. For example, two tokens of the sentence-type "The party occurs after the ceremony" will have the same truth-value regardless of when they are produced. Either they are both true, or they are both false. But the behaviour of sentence-types is irrelevant to considerations of whether a particular tensed token has the same truth conditions as a particular tenseless token. And using
Mellor's own examples we can see that they can have the same truth conditions. S (a token of a tensed sentence-type) and U (a token of a tenseless sentence-type) have the same truth conditions. Pointing to differences between the types of which they are tokens cannot undermine this fact.
It is worth remembering that the reason why Mellor wishes to deny that the tokens S and U have the same truth conditions is that he believes that this provides him with grounds for denying that S and U can translate each other. If he is forced to concede that they do have the same truth conditions, as it seems that he is, does he thereby relinquish his grounds for denying that they can translate each other? I will argue that, from the fact that S and U have the same truth conditions, it does not follow that they can translate each other. So, pace Smith, Mellor's theory does not collapse into the old B-theory of time.
The new B-theory of time accepts that tensed sentence-tokens are untranslatable by tenseless sentence-tokens. The main argument for this thesis is that a tensed sentence-token and a token of the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions do not convey the same information. Gale (1968) argued that tensed sentences entail tenseless sentences, but the converse entailment does not hold. For example, the tensed sentence "X is present and Y is future" entails the tenseless 7 sentence "X is earlier than Y", but the latter sentence entails nothing about the Aseries locations of X and Y. In an earlier paper (Gale (1962) ), he illustrates the difference in the information conveyed by tensed and tenseless sentences using the following example. Joe's job is to inform his military company when the enemy are within 100 yards of their position. If Joe shouts the tensed sentence "The enemy are now within 100 yards" his company is duly warned of their position and may take appropriate action. If, however, he tries to capture the information contained in this tensed sentence in terms of the tenseless relations between the event he is reporting and his utterance of the sentence, or the time at which he utters it, he will be unable to warn the company of the danger. If, for example, Joe shouts "The enemy are within 100 yards at 2.15pm", his company will not be warned unless they know that it is now 2.15pm, and this is a piece of tensed information. The conclusion that Gale draws from his arguments is that, since tense cannot be eliminated from language without also eliminating the ability to convey certain information, time itself must be tensed. The emergence of the new B-theory of time showed that this conclusion is unwarranted. Even though tense cannot be eliminated from language, all that follows is that language and thought are irreducibly tensed; time itself need not be. However, as the foregoing discussion has shown, it is possible for two sentencetokens to have the same truth conditions while having different meanings. So, it is possible for there to be an objective difference in meaning between two sentencetokens that is not discernible in their truth conditions. Having the same truth condition is necessary, but not sufficient, for having the same meaning. What is this difference in meaning?
A difference in sense !
In presenting her date version of the new B-theory of time, Michelle Beer (1988) suggests that a tensed sentence-token and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions are co-reporting, but differ from each other in sense. They are coreporting in that they report the existence of the same state of affairs, or the occurrence of the same event. So, for example, the tensed sentence-token, c, "It is now raining" uttered at t, and the tenseless sentence, d, that, according to Beer, states c's truth conditions "It rains at t" both report the existence of the same state of affairs. They both report that it rains at t. But since they cannot translate each other, they differ from each other in sense. Unfortunately, Beer does not offer any further conditions, but since they cannot translate one another, they differ in meaning. Since they have the same truth conditions, the difference between them in meaning, whatever it is, is not to be found at the level of truth conditions. Each sentence picks out the very same extra-linguistic entities and ascribes the very same properties to them and relations between them. But to argue, as Smith does, that the difference between them in meaning consists in the fact that only one of them ascribes a monadic tensed property to these extra-linguistic entities is to deny that the difference between them is not to be found at the level of truth conditions. It is, rather, to claim that there is a difference between them in the extra-linguistic entities they each pick out, since one, and only one, of them picks out a monadic tensed property as a constituent of reality. A difference such as this would reveal itself in the truth conditions of c and d.
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! However, despite the fact that Smith's attempt to identify the sense of a tensed sentence token is unsuccessful, it may be the case that the difference in meaning between c and d is explained by the fact that they have different senses.
After all, this case is not dissimilar to Frege's puzzle of identity, in which there is a difference in meaning between two sentences that is not discernible at the level of reference. The expressions "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" have the same referent, but they differ in sense. They each convey different information about their common referent. It may be that the way in which they differ is the same as the way in which "now", uttered at time t, differs from "at t", as these are also expressions with the same referent but different meanings. Perry, Castañeda, 3 and others, noted that indexical expressions have roles. The role of the indexical "now" is that it refers, on any occasion of utterance, to the moment at which it is uttered. The role of the indexical "here" is that it refers, on any occasion of utterance, to the place at which it is uttered. Can we identify the role of an indexical with its sense? ! There are a number of reasons for thinking that the role of an indexical is equivalent to the sense of a non-indexical expression in the way Frege intended.
!
Firstly, according to Frege, the sense of a non-indexical expression determines its reference. 4 An expression picks out the extra-linguistic entity that is its referent in a particular way. It is this way in which the referent is picked out, the mode of presentation of the referent, that is its sense. Co-referring terms pick out their common referent in different ways, and thus differ from each other in sense. The role of an indexical also determines its referent. For any occasion of utterance, an indexical expression picks out a feature of its context of utterance as its referent on that occasion. Secondly, Frege insists that senses are objective features of an 3 Perry (1977 3 Perry ( , 1979 , Castañeda (1989) . 4 Frege, (1892) Tuesday, then a sentence containing it must express the same thought on both occasions. But if two tokens of a sentence express the same thought, then they cannot differ in truth-value. A Monday token of "The games commence today" may be true, while a Tuesday token of the same sentence is false. So "today" cannot contribute the same sense to this sentence on each occasion. An alternative might be to say that the sense of "today" changes from day to day. But the role of "today" (ie, what we know when we know how to use the word correctly) doesn't change; it always picks out as its referent the day on which it is uttered. ! Frege's account of sense has two components, which cannot both be satisfied by the role of an indexical. Firstly, sense determines reference, but since different tokens of an indexical have different referents, it follows that they must each have different senses. Secondly, the sense of an expression is objective (capable of being 5 Frege, (1892) p. 60. 6 Frege, (1892) p. 62.
7 Perry (1977) .
grasped by any language user) and invariant between occasions of use. Now, while the role of an indexical remains invariant across occasions of use, and can be grasped by each language user, it picks out a different referent on each occasion of use, so the role cannot be the sense. The problems of attributing a Fregean sense to indexicals are particularly acute in the case of "I". The reference of "I" changes from language user to language user, and so, therefore, must the sense. It follows that the sense expressed by "I", would be unique and private to each individual, which 
We now have at our disposal an exposition of Kaplan's distinction between character and content. In the next section I will employ this distinction in an examination of tensed and tenseless date sentences in order to see if it sheds any light on the objective difference between them in meaning that does not reveal itself in their truth conditions.
The characters and contents of tensed and tenseless sentences
! My first task is to examine whether the character/content distinction is capable of providing an account of the difference in meaning between a tensed sentence-token and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions. Since conditions. An utterance of "now" at time t refers to t via its character. That particular utterance of "now" has the same referent as an utterance of the non-contextdependent expression "at t". But these expressions are not synonymous with each other because they differ from each other in character. The expression type "now"
has an indexical character, while the expression type "at t" has a fixed character.
Given a particular context, the same time can be picked out indexically, or via a definite description, but this does not establish synonymy between two such expressions, nor between sentences containing such expressions. So, even though two expressions may have the same content, it doesn't follow that they can translate each other.
!
Neither is an indexical synonymous with the rule, explicitly stated, that determines its reference on any occasion of utterance. In other words, to suppose that "now" is synonymous with, for example, "simultaneous with this utterance", or some other expression that states the rule that tells us how to determine the This generated a token-reflexive version of the translation claim. Kaplan's remarks illustrate why both attempts were bound to fail. ! An important difference between character and content is that character, as a kind of meaning, applies to sentence-, word-, and expression-types. Content, on the other hand, applies to occurrences of sentences, words and expressions in contexts (i.e., tokens of those types). (Kaplan (1989) that is necessary and sufficient for the truth of a sentence-type. Now, if the notion of content is only applicable to sentence-tokens, while character is only applicable to sentence-types, an answer to our problem begins to emerge. Sentence-tokens g and h cannot be synonymous, even though they have the same content, because they are tokens of types with different characters. Being tokens of types with different characters, there is an objective difference in meaning between them. But since they have the same content, and content is identified with truth conditions, the difference in meaning between them cannot be discerned in their truth conditions.
A token-reflexive account of the distinction between character and content
!
Kaplan's distinction between character and content yields a date version of the B-theory of time. This is because of his insistence on the direct reference theory of indexicals. To insist on the direct reference theory of indexicals is to maintain that, for example, a token of "now" refers directly to the time at which it is uttered.
Consequently, the time, referred to by some name, definite description or date, being the referent of "now", will occur in the truth conditions of a sentence-token containing it. Kaplan's reasons for insisting on the direct reference theory of indexicals are that he wishes to emphasize the distinction between the way an indexical, or other context-dependent expression, picks out its referent, and the way a non-context-dependent expression picks out its referent. ! What these tokens have in common is the extra-linguistic entity that they refer to, the event of Saturday's rain. They differ from each other in the temporal separation between that event and the utterance about it, and the token-reflexive account makes this explicit, whereas the date version does not. Two such tokens still "say the same thing" because they have the same content, but their truth conditions are different, as they should be, because in order to be true each token must be temporally related to that event in a different way. Thus, the token-reflexive version recognizes that we may talk about the same extra-linguistic entities, but from different temporal perspectives, and it adjusts for that different perspective tokenreflexively.
The token-reflexive version of Kaplan's distinction between character and content accounts for the objective difference in meaning between a tensed sentencetoken and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions just as well as did Kaplan's own version. The particular tokens, g and i, have the same truth conditions as each other, but they remain untranslatable by each other in virtue of the fact that they are tokens of sentence-types with different characters. As it turns out, g and i also differ in content; they do not say the same thing. But they are made true by the 24 existence of the same state of affairs (the simultaneity of g and the volcanic eruption).
Kaplan's distinction between character and content can be combined with a token-reflexive version of the tenseless truth conditions of tensed sentences. When it is so combined it yields an account of the objective difference in meaning between a tensed sentence-token and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions.
Indeed, I would argue that the conjunction of Kaplan's distinction and the tokenreflexive theory is more fine-grained and sensitive to the many facets of meaning than Kaplan's own date version of it. It is capable of accounting for how the truthvalue of a sentence-token depends on the temporal relation between what the sentence is about and the occurrence of the token itself. Furthermore, this conjunction supports the conclusion that temporal reality is tenseless, since the objective difference in meaning between tokens such as g and i does not require the existence of tensed temporal reality in order to be explained.
Conclusion
! My aim in this paper has been to reveal an aspect of the meanings of tensed sentences, and to provide a tenseless account of it. Tensed meaning reveals itself when we compare a tensed sentence token with a token of the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions. For any pair of sentences like this, we can see that they do not mean the same thing. But we can also see that they do have the same truth conditions. So tensed meaning does not reside in the truth conditions of tensed sentences. What we can conclude from this is that there is more to meaning than truth conditions. This additional component of meaning is a feature of the character of sentence-types. Since, when we assign truth conditions, we do so for sentencetokens, it should therefore not surprise us that the difference in meaning does not reveal itself there.
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! I hope to have shown that Kaplan's distinction between character and content can be successfully combined with the token-reflexive version of the new B-theory of time. This combination provides us with an adequate explanation of tensed meaning, and it does so without appealing to the existence of tensed facts.
